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Abstract
We first show (1) the importance of investigating health expenditure process using the
order two Markov chain model, rather than the standard order one model, which is widely
used in the literature. Markov chain of order two is the minimal framework that is capable
of distinguishing those who experience a certain health expenditure level for the first time
from those who have been experiencing that or other levels for some time. In addition,
using the model we show (2) that the probability of encountering a health shock first de-
creases until around age 10, and then increases with age, particularly, after age 40, (3) that
health shock distributions among different age groups do not differ until their percentiles
reach the median range, but that above the median the health shock distributions of older
age groups gradually start to first-order dominate those of younger groups, and (4) that the
persistency of health shocks also shows a U-shape in relation to age. (JEL: I10, I12, I18)
1 Introduction
How one’s health may evolve conditional on the current health status as one ages is a major
concern for anyone. It is also an important element in individuals’ decision making regarding
savings. From the perspective of private firms, it is a significant human resource management
issue, and for providers of private health and life insurances, a crucial component in pricing
their insurance policies competitively. From the viewpoint of public policy, understanding this
process is vital for designing socially desirable health care and health insurance policies. The
process of health state transition is also an important constituent in various economic models
that are used to evaluate alternative social policies.
This paper attempts to shed light on the health expenditure process by taking the incurred
annual medical cost as representing the health status, and by examining the information on
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medical costs found in receipts stored in a database which contains observations on over three
million individuals for the period of up to 11 years.
We use the age-dependent Markov chain of order two to capture the health state transition
instead of the usual Markov chain of order one. This allows us to identify states with different
levels of health shocks by taking into consideration states with a zero expenditure level in the
previous year and a certain expenditure level in the current year. Markov chain of order one
cannot isolate such states.
The four main findings of the present paper are as follows. First, conditioning only on
the state from a previous year cannot predict a patient’s future health expenditure path to the
extent that conditioning on the state from two previous years can. Second, the probability
of encountering a health shock first decreases until around age 10, and then increases with
age, particularly, after age 40. Third, health shock distributions among different age groups
do not differ until their percentiles reach the median range, but, above the median, the health
shock distributions of older age groups gradually start to first-order dominate those of younger
groups. And fourth, the persistency of health shocks also shows a U-shape in relation to age.
We describe the methodological framework we use in section 2. After describing the insti-
tutional background in Japan and the database we utilized in section 3, in section 4 we present
our estimation method. The main findings of the paper are discussed in section 5, while section
6 contains a conclusion.
2 Related Literature
Since long ago, the persistency of medical expenditure in individuals, the phenomenon that
those who have a high health expenditure in one year tend to continue paying high medical
fees in the following years too, has been observed and studied. For example, studies by McCall
and Wai (1983), Anderson and Knickman (1984), Beebe (1988) and Freeborn, Pope, Mullooly
and McFarland (1990) reveal such persistency among Medicare beneficiaries, while Newhouse,
Manning, Keeler and Sloss (1989), van Vliet (1992) and Coulson and Stuart (1992) point to a
positive correlation between high expenditure in adjacent years and a positive but relatively
low correlation between high expenditure in years farther apart, using data from other medi-
cal insurance schemes. More recently, a number of studies have divided the population based
on the quantiles of expenditure incurred in a certain year and traced the expenditure transi-
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tion following that year. (Garber, MaCurdy, McClellan et al., 1997; Monheit, 2003; Pauly and
Zeng, 2004; Riley, 2007; Cohen and Yu, 2012; Hirth, Gibson, Levy, Smith, Calónico and Das,
2015; Hirth, Calónico, Gibson, Levy, Smith and Das, 2016; Karlsson, Klein and Ziebarth, 2016).
However, this type of analysis becomes problematic when we compare the results for different
age groups, and our approach of defining patient categories based on the subjects’ absolute ex-
penditure overcomes that problem - a point we will elaborate on in more detail later. Eichner,
McClellan and Wise (1997) is an exceptional study in that it uses the absolute value of health
expenditure to divide the population in addition to the quantiles. Furthermore, Rettenmaier
and Wang (2006) conduct an estimation of Medicare reimbursement by using the Tobit model
and show that the lag variable has a statistically significant positive effect. Also, Kohn and
Liu (2013) use a British dataset on medical care use, and not health expenditure, and observe a
similar persistency in the utilization of that care. As for studies using Japanese data, Kan and
Suzuki (2005) find a stronger health expenditure persistence than that observed in research
using U.S. data. In addition, Suzuki, Iwamoto, Yuda and Morozumi (2012) as well as Ibuka,
Chen, Ohtsu and Izumida (2016) conduct the same kind of analysis as mentioned above - using
quantiles of expenditure in a certain year and observing the transition into the following year,
while Masuhara (2006) follows the analyses in Eichner et al. (1997).
Health expenditure dynamics are also investigated by using continuous health expendi-
tures. For example, Feenberg and Skinner (1994) study the time-series properties of health
expenditures by utilizing the health expenditure panel data provided by the U.S. Internal Rev-
enue Service (IRS). They use an ARMA model and find that the ARMA(1, 1) model better fits
the covariance structure of medical expenses, suggesting the persistency of medical expendi-
tures. Following Feenberg and Skinner (1994), and using the Health and Retirement Survey
(HRS) and the Assets and Health Dynamics of the Oldest Old (AHEAD), French and Jones
(2004) also find a highly persistent AR(1) health expenditure process. However, while their
approach can capture well the fact that health expenditures persist, their model specifications,
such as the constant persistency parameter, possibly miss heterogeneity in age and the initial
health status, as we shall later discuss.
The literature volume is large and, of course, the methods and results are varied, but what
can be said with relative certainty is that there is some persistency in individual health spend-
ing and that the persistency is not so strong as to enable us to predict future expenditure with
high accuracy based solely on the expenditure in a certain year. For example, Hirth et al. (2015)
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use U.S. private insurance data for subjects under age 65 from 2003 to 2006 to show that 43%
of enrollees in the top decile of health spending in a given year remained in the top decile the
following year and that 34% of them remained in the top decile five years later. Obviously,
this result does indicate persistency, since 43% and 34% are far above 10%, but it also suggests
that more than a half of the subjects in the top decile left it during the following year. Our
approach, conditioning on the states from two previous years, will help alleviate this problem,
by enabling a distinction between individuals in the same expenditure group whose health is
“temporarily” bad and those who suffer from a “continuous” bad condition.
When it comes to age, some of the previous studies above, including Kan and Suzuki (2005),
Cohen and Yu (2012) and Kohn and Liu (2013), state that older people tend to exhibit stronger
persistency in health expenditure than the young (Hirth et al. (2016) , however, present the
opposite result). Our rich dataset, however, allowed us to calculate the persistency for each
age and thus enabled us to see the differences between age groups in more detail than those
studies - we have found that persistency in relation to age exhibits a U-shaped curve.
In addition, there is another strain of literature that attempts to capture individuals’ health
expenditure through stochastic dynamic individual models. Some of these studies define ex-
penditure as a variable endogenously determined by individuals. This is the case with the
health asset model from the classic work of Grossman (1972), as well as with some recent stud-
ies, such as Hall and Jones (2007) and Yogo (2016). Furthermore, some studies define medical
expenses as exogenous expenditure, e.g. Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes (1995), Palumbo (1999),
Chou, Liu and Huang (2004) and Capatina (2015). However, the solutions of the individual’s
maximization problem in these studies depend only on the individual’s current health status,
which is why the authors were only able to describe health expenditure with a Markov chain
of order one. In contrast, our method treats that expenditure as a Markov chain of order two,
and thus possesses more predictive power regarding individuals’ future expenditure path.
The future elderly model, which was developed by Goldman, Shang, Bhattacharya, Garber
et al. (2005) and applied to Japanese data in Chen, Jalal, Hashimoto, chuan Suen, Eggleston,
Hurley, Schoemaker and Bhattacharya (2016) is another recent method for predicting individ-
uals’ future health expenditure paths based on their current status. However, this method too
can only address health expenditure as a Markov chain of order one, and cannot distinguish
between different individuals with the same current status.
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3 Methodological Framework
In the present study we use an age-specific Markov chain of order two as the main analytical
framework. The subjects’ health status is defined by the level of incurred medical cost. As
explained in the previous section, the existing studies have mainly used an age-dependent
Markov chain of order one, where health status is defined by age-dependent percentiles of
health expenditure.
First, using Markov chain of order two allows us to identify states with different levels of
health shocks by examining the states with zero expenditure level in the previous year and a
certain expenditure level in the current year. Markov chain of order one, however, does not let
us distinguish between such states.
Second, defining the states by using the absolute health expenditure allows us to easily
compare across ages the changes in the health transitions matrix. When the states are defined
using age-specific percentiles, this cannot be done easily.
Third, the large sample size of our data set allowed us to estimate the transition matrix for
each age without any parametric assumptions. This is in contrast with some previous studies,
such as Scholz, Seshadri and Khitatrakun (2006), Hansen, Hsu and Lee (2014) or Capatina
(2015), which assumed a functional form, such as polynomials, in age. Our large sample made
it possible for us to obtain results which might have been difficult to obtain with a parametric
approach.
4 Background and Data
In this section, we briefly describe the main features of the Japanese health care system and the
data set used.
4.1 Background
Japan has a universal, public health insurance system. In effect, this means that a significant
proportion of the medical costs incurred by the users, including prescription drugs, is covered
by their health insurance. The exact proportion of the cost that the health insurance user is
expected to bear varies in accordance with age and income. In the current system, most users,
aged 7 to 69, pay a 30% co-payment, whereas those between ages 70 and 74 are entitled to a
lower rate of 20%, unless they possess income comparable to that of the active work force, in
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which case they too are obliged to contribute 30% of the incurred health cost. Those over 75
years of age are required to make a small contribution of 10%, unless they continue to obtain
a significant income that is similar to that of the current workforce. For children under 7, the
co-payment rate is set at 20 percent.1
Also, it should be noted that, as a part of the current public health insurance scheme, the
users in Japan are spared from paying dramatically high medical expenses. The system that
makes that possible is called the high-cost medical expense benefit system (or “kogaku ryoy-
ohi seido”in Japanese). Under it, the users are reimbursed a portion of the amount they paid
through co-payment in case the cost that they had incurred had been very high. That is, the
system is designed to keep patients’ financial burden relatively light by compensating them if
their expenditure exceeds a specified threshold amount. The amount depends on the user’s
age and income level. For example, the threshold for users aged 7 to 69 who fall into the
medium-income bracket is 80,100 yen per month.
This benefit system is provided by several health schemes, including the National Health
Insurance (“kokumin kenko hoken” in Japanese) and the National Federation of Health Insur-
ance Societies (“kenko hoken kumiai” in Japanese), which offers employment-based health in-
surance. Under these schemes, insurance users can choose medical institutions freely. The
National Health Insurance is mostly utilized by persons in agriculture, family business and
self-employment, while paid company employees tend to use employment-based schemes pro-
vided by the National Federation of Health Insurance Societies (NFHIS). While insurance fees
vary across schemes depending on income and family composition, the content of the medical
service covered tends to be basically the same.
4.2 Data Description
In this study we employ data on medical insurance claims obtained from the Japan Medical
Data Center (JMDC). The JMDC claim database contains data on monthly receipts for more
than three million people who are covered by employment-based health insurance. It is a
longitudinal database that follows individuals as long as they participate in the same health
insurance. Company employees as well as their dependents are covered by this type of health
insurance. We use the JMDC data from fiscal year 2005 to 2015. As of March 2016 (the end
1It is worth noting that some local governments in Japan offer free medical services to children through subsidy
programs aimed at providing support for child-rearing.
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of the FY 2015), the database contained input from more than 90 employment-based health
insurance schemes.
The database provides demographic information, such as sex and age of the subjects and
their medical costs, including both expenses for treatment and pharmacons. The receipt data
are renewed every month. Based on that information on monthly medical costs, we calcu-
late the annual expenditure by multiplying the average monthly medical cost with 12. This
approach is taken because some individuals are in the database only for a part of the year.
It is worth noting that our data set has both advantages and disadvantages. First, since
the JMDC claim database contains only information on receipts, we cannot utilize the socio-
economic status of health insurance users, such as their income and educational background.
Also, as mentioned above, not all individuals are present in the database the whole year - some
of them drop out because they have withdrawn from the insurance scheme they used and some
because they have passed away. Unfortunately, we cannot clearly identify the reasons behind
the sample attrition. Nonetheless, when looking at the medical costs just before the subjects’
omission, we did not notice any strong evidence that individuals were systematically dropping
out from our sample, which is why we believe that the problem caused by sample attrition in
our dataset is not so serious. While we recognize these disadvantages, we wish to point out the
tremendous benefit that the precise information on medical expenditure and the large sample
size give us. Our receipt dataset provides information that is much more accurate than the self-
reported information on medical expenditure collected by the Health and Retirement Survey
(HRS) or the Assets and Health Dynamics of the Oldest Old (AHEAD) , which are often used
for examining the process of health transition. Also, our large sample size and the longitudinal
quality of the dataset are sufficient to enable us to examine the health state transition process
by age without making any parametric assumptions.
Before discussing the descriptive characteristics of medical costs found in the JMDC claim
database, it is important to check how the subjects appearing in that database differ from the
overall population. First, Table 1 shows the proportion of individuals who are company em-
ployees. From the table, we can see that almost all the men in their prime working age are
insured as company employees. However, that is not the case with the women in the database:
about two-thirds of them are insured as dependents. Second, in comparison with the popu-
lation mean for medical costs in 2010, found in a report by the Japanese Ministry of Health,
Labour and Welfare, the JMDC claim database seems to contain data on relatively healthier
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people. This could be a bias that exists because those who cannot work due to poor health
have not been included in the database. However, the mean of medical costs for individuals
below age 15, who cannot be employees since they are under age minors, seems to provide as-
surance that the JMDC claim database is representative, since the data for that age group come
across as similar to the population mean. In addition, the medical fee profiles share similar
trends, as indicated in Figure 1.
[Table 1 about here.]
[Figure 1 about here.]
Summary statistics are presented in Table 2. Means of medical costs show a U-shaped
age profile, with the bottom around the age of 20. The standard deviation of medical costs,
too, exhibits a U-shaped age profile. That is, children and old people tend to incur volatile or
extremely high medical costs. Furthermore, when we look at the distributional characteristics
of the medical costs, we first notice that the mean and the median values are largely different
(Table 2). This is because the upper tail (95 or 99 percentiles) is far longer than the lower tails
(5 or 1 percentiles). In addition, the upper tail becomes longer as one grows older. We also find
that there are about 10% of those who did not receive any medical services for the period of
one year.
[Table 2 about here.]
As for the gender difference, the summary characteristics of medical costs for males and
females are presented in Tables 3 and 4. Both men and women have a U-shaped medical cost
age profile. When it comes to children under age 15, the medical cost incurred is, on average,
slightly higher for boys. However, in the case of middle aged persons, age profiles of medical
cost are steeper for females. One of the reasons for this gender difference is that the female
sample is a mix of self-insured company employees and dependents, as can be seen in Table 1.
It could be that some women have endogenously quit their jobs due to bad health and, unlike
their male counterparts, such female individuals might have a greater probability of being
included in the sample as dependents. Thus, we cannot determine whether the difference in
comparison with males is of biological nature or due to the sample selection. Accordingly, in
the empirical analysis we present below, we focus on males’ medical costs. Also, since there
are many sample omissions for male individuals over age 60, we restrict our sample to males
aged 0-59.
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[Table 3 about here.]
[Table 4 about here.]
5 Estimation Method
We first define five mutually exclusive health transition states for each person-year unit, in
accordance with the medical cost in that year. Previous studies, such as Attanasio, Kitao and
Violante (2010) and Pashchenko and Porapakkarm (2013), have used quantiles of medical fees
for defining individuals’ health status. However, focusing on quantiles makes comparing the
health status across different ages difficult. That is why, in this paper, we define the health
status in relation to the level of medical costs incurred by individuals. That enables us to take
into account medical fee systems such as the above-mentioned high-cost medical care benefit
scheme.
We define the health transition states and health statuses as follows (Table 5). State Q1
means that the individual’s overall medical cost for that year is between 0 and 7,800 yen, which
corresponds to the actual expenditure of 2,340 yen at the co-payment rate of 30% (which is the
usual such rate for adults in Japan, as explained in section 3.1). In the present paper such
individuals are regarded as having the best health status, i.e., as being in best health. Similarly,
state Q2 means that the annual medical cost is between 7,801 and 24,000 yen (good health),
state Q3 that it is between 24,001 and 54,000 yen (relatively good health), whereas state Q4
denotes the annual cost between 54,001 and 266,999 yen (poor health), and state Q5 indicates
that the individual’s yearly medical cost exceeds 267,000 yen (poorest health). These values,
except for 267,000 yen, come from the rounded number of medical cost distribution for those
who are aged 30-40 and did not pay any medical fees in the previous year: below median for
state Q1, from the 50th to the 75th percentile for state Q2, from the 75th percentile to the 90th
percentile for Q3 and from the 90th percentile to 266,999 for state Q4. The value of 267,000 yen,
however, is derived from the monthly reimbursement threshold set by the high-cost medical
expense benefit scheme. Now that we have defined the health transition states based on the
distribution of medical costs for those who did not pay any medical fees in the previous year,
we turn our attention to the persistency of medical shocks - its magnitude and age-specific
differences.
[Table 5 about here.]
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Table 6 shows fractions of male individuals in each state defined in Table 5. Except for state
Q5, which is based on the threshold amount found in the high-cost medical expenses benefit
scheme, our state fractions do not show an extreme distribution, suggesting that our definition
of health status works well. Here we can see that more than a half of middle aged men pay
less than 7,200 yen (24,000 × 0.3 = 7,200 at the co-payment rate of 30%) a year, thus falling into
states Q1 and Q2, as defined in Table 5. Also, as can be observed in the summary statistics
(Table 3), after early infancy, the fractions of states Q4 and Q5 first decrease as individuals
grow to become adults, but then start to gradually increase as they get older, thereby creating
a U-shaped age profile.
[Table 6 about here.]
6 Results
In this section, we describe the four main findings of this paper. First, we suggest that condi-
tioning only on the state from a previous year cannot predict a patient’s future health expen-
diture path to the extent that conditioning on the states from two previous years can. Second,
we demonstrate that the probability of encountering a health shock first decreases until around
age 10, and then increases with age, particularly, after age 40. Third, health shock distributions
do not differ across age groups until their percentiles reach the median range, but above the
median, the health shock distributions of older age groups gradually start to first-order dom-
inate those of younger groups. And fourth, we find that the persistency of health shocks also
exhibits a U-shape in relation to age.
6.1 Markov Chain of Order Two Rather than Order One
When Markov chain of order one is used, different types of individuals, those who experience
a certain expenditure level for the first time and those who have been experiencing that expen-
diture level for some time, are mixed together in the same state. Markov chain of order two
is, thus, the minimal methodological framework that is capable of distinguishing those who
experience a certain health expenditure level for the first time from those who have been expe-
riencing that or other levels for some time. Here, we present several results that indicate the
importance of using Markov chain of order two for investigating the life cycle properties of the
health expenditure process.
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[Figure 2 about here.]
Figure 2 shows the actual transition frequency to the worst health status (state Q5) from the
same status (Q5) for different age groups. 2 In age group 55–59 (the oldest group), 68.9% of the
subjects who were in state Q5 at the year of conditioning maintained that status one year later.
That means that about 70% of the people who paid more than 80,100 yen for health care in a
certain year also paid more than 80,100 yen the following year. Two years later, the percentage
of Q5 decreases to 64.2%. If the 70% who were in Q5 one year later were the same as those who
had been in state Q5 in the year of conditioning, we would expect the percentage of persons in
Q5 to decrease to about 49% (=70%×70%) plus a transition to Q5 from other states, but since
that possibility is small, we can ignore it in our calculation. The actual ratio (64.2%) is obviously
higher than that. Figure 3 shows the same graph for age group 55–59 as in Figure 2 and the
hypothetical path of that group if the frequency of those who remained in the same health state
one year later (68.9%) continued in the following years.
[Figure 3 about here.]
As can be observed from the figure, the rate of decrease in the percentage of subjects with
the worst health status (state Q5) is very slow - even five years later 59.0% of the subjects remain
in state Q5. This result suggests that, among the people in state Q5, there are two main types
of patients - the high expenditure on health for some of them is due to “temporary” health
shocks, and such subjects have enough chance to restore their health, but on the other hand,
some patients’ large spending is due to more “continuous” health shocks, so many of them will
have to continue paying large sums at present and in the future. To illustrate this more point
clearly, next we show how future health expenditure paths differ depending on the medical
cost from the previous two years.
[Figure 4 about here.]
Figure 4 indicates the empirical transition probabilities for the age group 55–59, but in it
the sample for that age group is divided in accordance with the subjects’ health expenditure
from two years before the year of conditioning. The graph “all” in the figure is identical with
2The frequencies are calculated based on the population that remained in the database. The omission rate in our
data is relatively high. For example, among individuals in the age group 55–59, the percentage of those who we
could not observe one year later is 8.60%, and two years later is 44.49%. However, we have checked and confirmed
that the difference in medical costs between the subjects from each age group who remained in the database and
those who dropped out of it is not so large.
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the one in Figure 2. The graphs in Figure 4 clearly indicate that persons in the same state Q5
have dramatically different probabilities to remain in it in the following years, depending on
their state from two years before. Thus, if individuals in the age group under discussion here
paid over 80,100 yen for their health (i.e., if they were in state Q5) in a certain year, but their
expenditure was under 16,200 yen in the previous year (i.e., they were in state Q1, Q2 or Q3 in
the previous year), then only about one-third of them will remain in state Q5 in the following
year. However, if their medical cost was over 267,000 yen (in state Q5) in the previous year too,
then more than 80% (83.9%) of them will remain in state Q5 the following year. Similar results
are observed for all other age groups, too.
This clear difference in health expenditure paths indicates that the health status of the in-
dividuals who were in the same Q5 state is varied - some were temporarily in poor health,
with many among them cured the following year, while others seemed to be in poor health
for a longer period, with most of them remaining in state Q5 for a protracted period of time.
Thus, by taking into account the subjects’ medical costs for the previous year in addition to the
current year, we can, at least partially, decompose mixed populations into their “real” health
statuses.
6.2 Initial Health Shock Occurrence Probabilities and their Distribution
In this section, we examine how initial health shock probabilities differ across age groups. We
also examine how the distribution of the magnitude of the health shocks differs across age
groups.
[Figure 5 about here.]
[Figure 6 about here.]
Figure 5 indicates box plots of the annual medical costs for each age group, conditioning
on that they are in the best health condition (state Q1) in the previous year. This practically
means that we take up people who experienced a health problem after having spent virtually
no money on health the year before. This justifies calling the expenditures “health shocks.”
Figure 6 shows the distribution of “health shock” magnitude by age groups.
These figures suggest that, except for age groups under 15, the distribution of health shocks
is roughly similar for all age groups up to the group 40–45. After that age group, a small in-
creasing trend in accordance with the rise in age is visible, especially for health shocks beyond
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the median level. In particular, the graphical expositions in the two figures, along with the dot-
ted lines which indicate the threshold values that define the five states, seem to show that each
health state defined by these values contains a certain number of people from all age groups,
except from the group age 0 to 5. If that is the case, defining the states based on absolute expen-
diture, and not percentiles, should allow us to interpret the meaning of each state more easily
and to standardize health shocks for different age groups.
[Table 7 about here.]
In order to make the differences in medical costs between patients who are in the same
state but have transitioned from other states in the previous year visible, we present Table 7,
which shows the summary statistics of medical costs of patients in the poorest health (state Q5)
divided by the age group and the state in the previous year (Here we only show the transition
paths from the states Q1 and Q5). Roughly speaking, the median values for each age group
in these two transition paths do not differ dramatically. On the other hand, mean values show
a more obvious difference, especially for those in their teens and twenties, but this is mainly
due to the very large difference in the maximum values. Therefore, we can say that, for most
individuals in the same current state, the medical cost is not so different in relation to their state
in the previous year.
Next, in Figure 7, we show the frequency of each state for each age, including a “missing”
state, given that the subjects were in state Q1 the previous year. This figure can be interpreted
as the change in the frequency of health shocks for healthy people in relation to their age.
[Figure 7 about here.]
We can see that the frequency of state Q5 is very low for all ages (in fact, it is below 4 % for
all ages except age 1 and the ages over 59), but that it increases slightly with age. To view this
in more detail, see Figure 8 in which the frequency of state Q5, extracted from Figure 7, has
been plotted.
[Figure 8 about here.]
From age 1 to 9, the probability of experiencing a major health shock decreases, recording
the minimum value of 0.64% at age 9. From age 10, however, it gradually increases with age,
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reaching 4.11% at the age of 60.3 In particular, the slope of the graph becomes steeper over age
40. The percentage is still low around age 60, but health shocks occur approximately four times
more often to people who are 60 years old than to those who are in their 20s or 30s (around
1%). This is not a small difference when we consider people’s dynamic behaviors, e.g. asset
accumulation or participation in health insurance.
It is worth noting that the presented result is not due to the setting of the threshold level.
Figure 9 shows a graph similar to that in Figure 8, but indicates the frequency of states Q4 and
Q5, i.e., the percentage of people who pay over 16,200 yen for health in a given year but paid
only 2,340 yen or less in the previous year. Here too we can find a similar increasing trend.
[Figure 9 about here.]
We also observe similar results when we condition the sample on the best health status
(state Q1) both at age t− 1 and t− 2 (Figure 10).
[Figure 10 about here.]
To sum up, these figures suggest that the probability of a health shock increases as age
increases, especially after age 40. This result indicates that when we are constructing a con-
sumer’s dynamic optimization model with medical costs, we need to model the transition
probabilities of health status or health expenditure age-dependent if we want to incorporate
the heterogeneous behaviors of consumers as they age.
6.3 Persistency After Health Shocks
In this section, we will see that the “persistency” of health shocks differs according to age. First,
in Figure 11, we indicate the empirical transition probabilities to each state from state Q5 for
each age group.
[Figure 11 about here.]
Compared to Figure 7, the probability of high expenditure (states Q4 or Q5) is clearly higher,
which suggests that once people suffer a health shock, they tend to stay in poor health the fol-
lowing year, meaning that the adverse effect of health shocks on health (and on health expen-
diture) persists over years.
3Since the database we utilize consists of information on company employees, a large selection issue presents
itself for ages beyond 60, since that was the age of mandatory retirement in the period observed. For this reason,
we choose not to report results for ages 61 and above.
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Furthermore, the persistency differs across ages. We can see that the frequency of state Q5,
the highest health expenditure group, fluctuates between about 30% and 45% for the young
ages (ages 1 to 25), and then starts to increase with age. For ages over 50, the probability of
state Q5 is over 60% — roughly double the value for ages around 25. We can, therefore, say
that health shock persistency is higher for the very young and for those over 45.
Similar to Figure 9, here too we can see that the persistency is not due to the level of the
threshold set. Figure 12 displays a graph similar to that in Figure 11 but indicates the empirical
transition probabilities to states Q4 or Q5 from Q5, e.g. the percentage of people who pay over
16,200 yen per year to maintain their health. Although the persistency for children, in particular
those below 10, becomes high and shows almost the same magnitude as in those over 45, the
results are similar to the results in Figure 11.
[Figure 12 about here.]
Considering our previous argument that in the state Q5 there are both people with tem-
porary and with relatively continuous health issues, the higher persistency for older people
may simply reflect the fact that a larger portion of them is in state Q5 with continuous health
problems, which accumulate with age. To help assess this possibility, in Figure 13 the same
frequencies of state Q5 are plotted, but this time the conditioning is not only on Q5 for the year
before, but also on state Q1 for two years before. Thus, it may be said that this graph focuses
on individuals who have experienced a large health shock.
[Figure 13 about here.]
Due to the small sample size (there are only around 50 subjects of each age under 10), the
graph starts to fluctuate, in comparison to the corresponding graph in Figure 11. Nonetheless,
we can also observe that the persistencies become higher as age increases. Thus, this graph too
reinforces our finding regarding persistency and age.
Note, however, how the magnitude of the transition probabilities drops to about 35% in
Figure 11 from over 60% in Figure 13 for those who are 60. This again shows the importance of
using at least the order two Markov chain model.
To see how persistency varies across ages, we conduct another analysis. First, we calculate
the transition probabilities to each state, conditional on the state one year before for each age.
Then, by designating one state at some age, we calculate transition probabilities for each state
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at each age for the future using the estimated probabilities. Finally, we compare the difference
between the calculated transition probabilities which start from the best health status (state Q1)
with those which start from the worst health status (state Q5), and interpret these differences
as the effects of a health shock over time. Since the effect of the first state vanishes as we iterate
the probabilities repeatedly, the difference goes to zero as years pass. Figure 14 shows these
differences for several start ages.
[Figure 14 about here.]
It is clear that the probability increase of state Q5 is the highest for all the following years
when one starts from the worst health status at age 55, as well as that it is second highest when
it starts from age 45. Although the probability differences almost vanish in six years (becoming
less than 1%) for relatively younger ages (under 35), the difference that starts from age 55 is
6.20% and that from age 45 is 4.50%. Therefore, we can confirm that health shock persistency
becomes higher and longer as age increases. When we check the probability increase of states
Q4 and Q5 combined, and not only of state Q5, we come to similar results. (Figure 15).
[Figure 15 about here.]
Again, having in mind the existence of the mixture of types of people in the worst health
status (state Q5), we conduct the same analysis, this time conditioning on two states. We calcu-
late the transition probabilities to each state, conditional on the state one year before and two
years before (therefore, using 5× 5 = 25 patterns) for each age, and then plot the differences be-
tween the calculated transition probabilities for transitions that start from the best health status
(state Q1) both one and two years before, and those that start from state Q5 one year before and
from state Q1 two years before. We see a similar relationship in Figure 16. However, again, it is
worth noting that the level of persistency changes drastically and that those who are 35 years
old now show more persistency than those who are 15 or 25, and become similar to children
age 5.
[Figure 16 about here.]
In this section, we have focused on the analysis of five health transition states defined in
relation to the medical costs incurred. This is because, as we have already explained, medical
costs are highly skewed, which is why regression results using exact amounts of incurred cost
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may be distorted by outliers. Nonetheless, to demonstrate the robustness of our results using
the five states, here we present some simple regression results obtained by using exact amounts
of medical cost.
[Figure 17 about here.]
[Figure 18 about here.]
Figures 17 and 18 plot the simple auto regression results for health expenditures for each
age, including year dummies. Similar to our previous results, they show that the coefficients
for the incurred medical fees for the previous year, which corresponds to the persistency of
a health shock, as we have argued, vary across ages, recording the minimum values when
individuals are in their 20s, and increasing from there onwards as age increases. We obtain
similar results even if we include the medical cost for two years before (Figure 18), or include
more lag variables. These additional results confirm that our main results were not due to the
definition of the thresholds for the states.
In conclusion, when people experience a health shock at some age, that effect may persist
in the following years. The persistency rate, however, differs across ages: it decreases during
ages 0 to early 30s, falling to the minimum when individuals are in their 20s and early 30s, but
increases starting from late 30s. These results imply that consumers’ dynamic behaviors, such
as saving or participating in health insurance, should differ across ages not only because of their
remaining lifetime or family structure, but also because of the differences in the probability of
a health shock and in health shock persistency.
6.4 Implications of the Results
At the end, we conduct a brief simulation of the expected medical costs after health shocks
by using the Markov chain of order two model. In the previous section, we estimated the
transition probability matrix for each age group. By using these results, now, we can calculate
the predicted medical costs by multiplying the sum of the incurred medical costs in each year
with the transition probability of each state. By repeating the same operation, we simulate the
medical costs for the period of ten years after the initial health shock, i.e. from the best health
status (state Q1) to the worst health state (state Q5), and then compare the predicted medical
costs of those who experienced such health shocks and those who did not.4 Note that we are
4For more details, see the appendix.
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looking at the ten-year total medical cost for which at least someone needs to pay.5 We choose
the median of the threshold values of each state as the medical costs for that state, except for
(Q5). For state (Q5), which represents the poorest health, we change the value of the annual
medical cost in order to investigate various possible cases.
We first examine the case in which individuals in the worst health state (Q5) incur the
medical cost of 267,000 yen every year - the amount which comes from the threshold value of
medical costs for those who are in the worst health state (Q5) (Figure 19). Since we employed
the lowest possible value for the worst health state (Q5), the predicted ten-year medical cost
should represent the lower bound. The simulation results show that, for all age groups, the
predicted ten-year medical cost will almost double if individuals experience health shocks, i.e.
the transition from the best health status (Q1) to the worst health status (Q5). In addition, the
differences in the predicted ten-year medical costs exhibit a U-shaped age profile, reflecting the
fact that cost persistency differs according to age, as we have seen in section 6.3. Also, even in
this optimistic scenario, the ten-year total medical cost incurred by those who moved from the
best health status (state Q1) to the worst health status (state Q5) at age 55 amounts to about 1.8
million yen.
[Figure 19 about here.]
Next, we consider two more cases: that individuals who are in poorest health (state Q5)
incur the annual medical cost of (1) 0.5 million yen, and (2) one million yen. We first investigate
how these two cases appear in our dataset, i.e., search for individuals who have moved from
the best health status (state Q1) to the worst health status (state Q5), and check how many
of them incurred the above-mentioned amounts of annual medical cost. The probabilities of
encountering such major health shocks are presented in Table 8. Among those who moved
from the state of best health (Q1) to the state of worst health (Q5), about a half encountered a
health shock that cost around 0.5 million. The fraction of individuals whose annual medical
costs amounted to one million yen was smaller than that of those who suffered a 0.5 million
yen shock, about 20–30%, but increased with age.
[Table 8 about here.]
5Here we have focused not on individuals’ health expenditure but the total medical cost mainly due to the
following two reasons. First, we do not observe the actual expenditure when it comes to some of the individuals
who have the poorest health status (state Q5). This is because some of them make use of the high-cost medical
expense benefit system and some do not. In addition, some municipal governments offer free medical services to
children through medical expenses subsidy programs aimed at providing support for child-rearing, so we are not
able to precisely measure the actual medical expenditure for children either.
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A new setting and the simulated medical costs of those who experience a health shock and
those who do not is presented in Figure 20. Here we focused only on the results for subjects
age 25 and 55 for the sake of simplicity and comparison. As can be seen from the figure, the
difference in medical expenditure over the period of ten years between those who suffered
health shocks and those who did not increases. While in the case of the lower threshold the
difference was about 0.9 million yen for males aged 55, the difference grew to about 2.8 million
yen in the case where the annual medical costs was one million yen. In addition, the predicted
ten-year medical cost of those who moved from the best health status (state Q1) to the worst
health status (state Q5) increases significantly. For example, the predicted ten-year medical cost
for males aged 55 rises from 1.8 million yen to about 4.5 million yen, if we conduct simulation
using the value of one million yen for the worst health status (state Q5).
[Figure 20 about here.]
To sum up, these simulation results indicate that once individuals transition from the best
to the worst health status, their economic burden more than doubles over the following ten
years. In addition, taking into account that health insurance users in Japan are reimbursed a
portion of the amount they paid through co-payment in case the medical cost that they had
incurred was very high, these results also imply that the economic burden is non-negligible
not only for the individuals, but also for the entire health insurance system, especially in the
case of the cost generated by older men.
7 Conclusion
We have demonstrated the importance of using the Markov chain of order two to capture health
transitions appropriately. By defining health status in terms of absolute expenditure levels,
rather than age-dependent quantiles that are often used in the literature, we have traced the
health transition process over the life cycle for males.
In this paper, however, we have not utilized specific illnesses to classify the subjects. Con-
ditioning based on such information, as well as the concrete treatment patients received would
allow us to better predict future outcomes. Since patients possesses that type of information,
it certainly affects their decisions, which is why it is important to have more detailed physical
information and conduct conditioning based on more precisely defined health transition states.
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In this paper, following previous literature, we have taken health expenditure as the defin-
ing feature of the health status. However, clearly, in reality health expenditure is an outcome
determined jointly by underlying factors such as the health care system, the health insurance
scheme and the economic conditions of households, as well as by health-related events in the
life of an individual.
For example, many municipalities in Japan offer free medical services to children aged 15
or below through infants’ and children’s medical expenses subsidy programs. Thus, if health
is defined in terms of medical costs or expenditure, individuals aged 16 or above may look
healthier, as they tend to abstain from using health care services more than children aged 15 or
below, who have access to free medical services. Therefore, an important work that lies ahead
of us is finding ways to overcome these difficulties.
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Appendix
Medical Fees Predicted by Using Markov Chain of Order Two
We define the matrix of transition from (i, j) into (i′, j′), where the first argument is the past
state and the second argument is the current state. In our case it is a 25× 25 matrix. We order
the states so that initial states are in the order of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and the ending states are in the
same order, so that column (i, j) is ordered as (1, 1), (1, 2), . . ., (1, 5), (2, 1), (2, 2), . . ., (2, 5), . . .,
(5, 1), (5, 2), . . ., (5, 5) and the row is ordered as (1, 1), (2, 1), . . ., (5, 1), (1, 2), (2, 2), . . ., (5, 2),
. . ., (1, 5), (2, 5), . . ., (5, 5).
We then compute the transition probabilities. The probability of moving from (i, j) to (i′, j′)
is zero if j 6= i′, and if j = i′, then it equals
5
∑
i=1
p(j′|i, i′).
Let ι5 denote the vector of 5 ones and ej to denote a vector with 1 as the jth element and 0
for the rest of the arguments. Given this transition probability matrix P, the expectation in the
next period starting from state j (j = 1, . . . , 25) can be computed as below, where T denotes a
transpose of a vector or a matrix: let M be a vector representing the health expenditure for the
5 states 1, . . . , 5,
(M⊗ ι5)TPej.
The expectation in the second period is:
(M⊗ ι5)TP2ej.
What we want to compute is the sum of these numbers for e1 and e5, i.e. compare expectations
for (1, 1) and (1, 5).
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Figure 1: Comparison with the Population Mean
Source: The Japan Medical Data Center (JMDC) claim database and the 2012 annual report "Basic Data
on Medical Insurance" by the Japanese Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (http://www.mhlw.go.jp/
file/06-Seisakujouhou-12400000-Hokenkyoku/kiso22.pdf)
Figure 2: Empirical Frequencies of Transition to State Q5 (Poorest Health) from State Q5 at t
Source: The Japan Medical Data Center (JMDC) claim database
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Figure 3: Observed vs Predicted (Order 1 Markov Chain) Frequency of State Q5 (Poorest
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Source: The Japan Medical Data Center (JMDC) claim database
Figure 4: Empirical Frequencies of State Q5 (Poorest Health) from State Q5 at t with Different
States at t− 1 for Age Group 55–59
Source: The Japan Medical Data Center (JMDC) claim database
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Figure 5: Box Plots of Medical Costs at Age t Given that the Subjects were in Best Health (state
Q1) at Age t− 1 (Male)
Source: The Japan Medical Data Center (JMDC) claim database
Figure 6: Empirical CDFs of the Logarithm of Medical Costs at Age t Given that the Subjects
were in Best Health (state Q1) at Age t− 1 (Male)
Source: The Japan Medical Data Center (JMDC) claim database
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Figure 7: Empirical Frequency of Suffering a Health Shock at Age t Given that the Subjects
Were in Best Health (State Q1) at Age t− 1 (Male)
Source: The Japan Medical Data Center (JMDC) claim database
Figure 8: Empirical Frequency of Suffering a Large Health Shock (Q5) at Age t Given that the
Subjects Were in Best Health (state Q1) at Age t− 1 (Male)
Source: The Japan Medical Data Center (JMDC) claim database
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Figure 9: Empirical Frequency of Suffering a Large Health Shock (Q4 or Q5) at Age t Given
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Source: The Japan Medical Data Center (JMDC) claim database
Figure 10: Empirical Frequency of Poorest Health Q5 at Age t Given that the Subjects Were in
Best Health (state Q1) Both at Age t− 1 and Age t− 2 (Male)
Source: The Japan Medical Data Center (JMDC) claim database
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Figure 11: Empirical Frequency of Poorest Health (state Q5) at Age t Given that the Subjects
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Source: The Japan Medical Data Center (JMDC) claim database
Figure 12: Empirical Probabilities of Transitions from State Q5 to States Q4 or Q5 at Age t
(Males)
Source: The Japan Medical Data Center (JMDC) claim database
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Source: The Japan Medical Data Center (JMDC) claim database
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Table 1: Fraction of Self-insured Individuals in the JMDC Claim
Database and their Mean Annual Medical Costs (thousand yen)
in Comparison with the Population Mean
Fraction of Self-insured Medical Costs (mean)
Age Male Female Population JMDC
0-4 0.00% 0.00% 220 206.0
5-9 0.00% 0.00% 116 104.6
10-14 0.00% 0.00% 80 76.2
15-19 10.39% 3.42% 66 57.6
20-24 58.20% 37.96% 70 51.4
25-29 94.03% 59.93% 88 61.8
30-34 98.61% 43.03% 103 73.3
35-39 99.47% 34.04% 113 81.9
40-44 99.71% 29.93% 130 94.0
45-49 99.79% 27.69% 162 119.2
50-54 99.75% 26.08% 205 159.6
55-59 99.45% 24.77% 260 206.8
60-64 98.19% 22.71% 346 262.8
65-69 95.01% 13.64% 445 334.8
70-74 81.70% 5.44% 609 485.0
75-79 68.58% 4.37% 761 533.5
Data Sources: The Japan Medical Data Center (JMDC)
claim database and the 2012 annual report "Basic Data
on Medical Insurance" by the Japanese Ministry of Health,
Labour and Welfare (http://www.mhlw.go.jp/file/
06-Seisakujouhou-12400000-Hokenkyoku/kiso22.pdf)
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Table 5: Definition of Health Status (Japanese yen)
State Annual Medical Costs Co-payments (30%)
Q1 0 ∼ 7,800 0 ∼ 2,340
Q2 7,801 ∼ 24,000 2,341 ∼ 7,200
Q3 24,001 ∼ 54,000 7,201 ∼ 16,200
Q4 54,001 ∼ 266,999 16,201 ∼ 80,099
Q5 267,000 ∼ –
Note: In this paper we regard individuals in state Q1
as being in best health condition, those in Q2 as being
in good health, whereas Q3 represents relatively good
health, Q4 stands for poor health and Q5 for poorest
health. Furthermore, it is important to note that we do
not observe the actual expenditure when it comes to in-
dividuals who have the poorest health status (state Q5)
because some of them make use of the high-cost medical
expenses benefit system and some do not. For states Q1
to Q4, the co-payment corresponds to the actual expen-
diture.
Table 6: Fraction of Health Transition States by Age Group, Males
Fraction of each state ( % )
Age Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
0-4 6.0 7.1 15.2 56.9 14.7
5-9 7.1 12.7 23.9 49.6 6.8
10-14 14.3 20.9 27.6 33.6 3.6
15-19 30.3 26.3 22.3 18.4 2.7
20-24 41.9 26.9 17.1 11.8 2.3
25-29 39.3 26.6 18.0 13.5 2.6
30-34 35.6 25.4 19.2 16.7 3.2
35-39 33.3 23.5 19.2 20.0 4.1
40-44 31.4 20.9 18.0 24.1 5.6
45-49 28.4 18.2 16.4 29.2 7.9
50-54 23.7 14.9 14.8 35.4 11.2
55-59 19.0 11.9 13.0 40.8 15.3
Data Source: The Japan Medical Data Cen-
ter (JMDC) claim database
We defined the health transition states ac-
cording to individual’s overall medical cost
for that year: 0–7,800 yen for Q1, 7,801–
24,000 yen for Q2, 24,001–54,000 yen for
Q3, 54,001–266,999 yen for Q4 and over
267,000 yen for Q5.
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Table 8: The Proportion of Subjects Encountering Medical Costs of above 500,000 and 1,000,000
Yen among Those Who Transitioned from Best Health (state Q1) to Poorest Health (state Q5)
(%)
Medical Costs above
500,000 yen 1,000,000 yen
Age Proportion (%) Proportion (%)
0-4 34.2 8.2
5-9 41.9 12.5
10-14 47.6 15.4
15-19 55.7 25.0
20-24 53.0 21.8
25-29 50.2 21.2
30-34 50.0 20.2
35-39 50.3 22.0
40-44 53.4 24.9
45-49 55.1 28.5
50-54 59.8 32.5
55-59 61.9 36.2
Data Sources: The Japan Medical Data Center
(JMDC) claim database
We defined the health transition states accord-
ing to individual’s overall medical cost for
that year: 0–7,800 yen for Q1, 7,801–24,000
yen for Q2, 24,001–54,000 yen for Q3, 54,001–
266,999 yen for Q4 and over 267,000 yen for
Q5.
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